In this research paper the main forces that influence different kinds of corporate control of the largest firms by country are evaluated. Firms controlled by individuals, Government, miscellaneous investors or widely held, exist under different circumstances. While firms controlled by individuals are small, proliferate on civil-law based countries with low levels of economic freedom, firms controlled by Governments multiply under low standards of disclosure, undeveloped financial markets and non catholic environments. On the other hand, the presence of miscellaneous investors is more frequent when stocks are glamorous and small wherein the smaller shareholder can easily use their limited resources and monitoring the management/larger shareholder. Finally, widely held firms are large and are stimulated by an economic freedom behavior.
Introduction
Corporate ownership of the US firms has been characterized as widely held by small shareholders, since the seminal work of Berle and Means (1932) , where the management plays an important role in the control of the firm. This can be explained by several reasons related with the legal system and the responsibility of the State on the economy. However, not even all countries have the same legal system, the same interventionism of the Government on the economy, the same financial infrastructures, the same standards of transparency, the same economic history, and consequently the corporate ownership and the characteristics of shareholders are diffused around the world. The role of economic history is clearly relevant to understand corporate control, for example the Nordic countries historically use dual class shares, in Spain, Italy and Austria the mutualism has been protagonist along their history, in Turkey and Chile the State protected families and in Denmark foundations plays a decisive role in the control of firms. These evidences can´t be ignored to understand how corporate ownership is so different around the world. For example, according to the results of Becht and Roell (1999) the degree of ownership concentration in the UK and in the USA is smaller than in Continental Europe. Faccio and Lang (2002) , based on a sample of Western European firms, present similar results, that is, there is a large number of widely held firms in the UK and Ireland, in comparison to continental Europe. They show that smallest firms and industrial firms are more family-owned than financial institutions, and in some countries the State plays a decisive role in the largest firms. Claessens et al (2000) , using a sample of 2,980 East Asian companies from 9 countries, show how firms from that region are largely family-owned, as well as how corporate wealth is in the hands of a few families. However, the debate over corporate ownership and the importance of the legal system and other country infrastructures is far from ending. While La Porta et al (1999) confirm the idea that in countries with higher antidirector rights, namely in the US, wherein investors are well protected, the corporate ownership is widely held, on the contrary, countries with low shareholder protection, wherein the State interferes in private business, the largest firms are more family-owned, the voting rights are separate from the cash flow rights, namely through multiple classes of stock, cross-shareholdings, and pyramidal structures, and the ownership is less diffused. More recently this assumption has been refused. Holderness (2009) , based on a sample of 23 countries, refutes the idea that corporate ownership in US firms is more diffused than in other countries. His research documents that 96% of the US firms from their sample have blockholders with at least 5% of firm's voting rights. His result contradicts the assumption that the stronger US investor protection rights account for the widely held ownership of US firms. But the debate concerning corporate ownership around the world is not limited to evaluate how concentrated shareholders structures are around the world. For example, La Porta et al (1999) analyzing the ultimate firm owners, based on voting rights, assess whether those depend on the characteristics of the legal system in 27 countries. Basically they define six types of ultimate owners: widely held, family, State, widely held Financial, widely held corporation and miscellaneous. In this research paper it will be analyzed, considering different ultimate owners -mixed, individuals, Government and widely held -, based on voting rights, which variables influence the most each kind of ultimate owner.
In this research paper we pretend to evaluate which variables, firm or country specific, determine the ultimate ownership. Questions like firms being controlled by individuals on undeveloped financial markets or firms controlled by the Government subsisting on Catholic environments are evaluated. This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the methodology;. Section 3 presents the results for the definitions, for the variables and for the regressions. Section 4 concludes.
Data and methodology

2.1.Data
The data extracted from Factset/Lionshres database includes the ultimate owners of the largest firms 20 firms from 31 countries obtained from Worldscope database (Worldscope item, WC08001) and respects to the end 2005, more precisely to the period between 2005 and March 2006, depending on the information supplied by firms. These data were compared with those obtained from different 620 firm´s websites. We selected firms from the following countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, the UK, and the US.
Methodology
Definitions of Variables
Dependent variables
While voting rights determine corporate control, cash flow rights are used to evaluate corporate ownership. It is important to distinguish both concepts because they usually present different results, particularly when the shareholdings are based on pyramidal structures, a way wherein large shareholders obtain control with the least amount of capital. For example, if investor A holds 5% of the shares of firm X, and simultaneously 20% of shares of the firm Y, which in its turn also owns 10% of firm X, then we may say that A has 7% (5%+20%*10%) of cash flow rights and controls 15% of voting rights (min(10%,20%)+5% Lifeco. In these cases we are in the presence of a pyramidal structure. The use of this type of strategy has been analyzed and criticized because it is an interesting way for the large shareholders, particularly families, to maintain control of a firm and simultaneously to expropriate private benefits from minority shareholders (see Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006));
 Government -when a State is the sole shareholder that controls a significant percentage of voting rights, a firm is Government owned. For example, Hafslund ASA, a Norwegian electric utility, has two shareholders who own more than 5% of voting rights. One is Oslo Kommune, a Norwegian Government institution with 58.5% of total voting rights, the other is Fortum Oyj, a Finnish public company with 32.8% of total voting rights, whose main shareholder (with more than 5% of voting rights) is the Finnish Government with 51.5% of voting rights. Thus, Finnish Government controls 32.8% of total voting rights of Hafslund ASA;  Miscellaneous -whenever a structure differed from the previous, we define it as mixed. 
Independent variables
To determine which variables influence the most kind of corporate control firm-level variables and country-level variables are assessed (see tables I and II):
Firm level variables
 Size -We expect a negative relationship between firm size and fraction of corporate control, ceteris paribus. Wealth constraints, in addition to risk aversion imply that an ultimate owner is less able to accomplish as a firm becomes larger (Demsetz and Lehn (1985) , Prowse (1992) and Holderness (2009)). We use the (natural logarithm) market capitalisation, dollar denominated, to control the size of a firm (Worldscope Item,
WC07211);
 Volatility -A firm with more volatile profit rate is more difficult to monitor and to control, and as a result the level of ownership concentration is expectably higher, in order to avoid eventual abuses by management. The results obtained by Prowse (1992) for the Japanese market confirm the previous relationship for independent firms, but not for keiretsu firms. In fact, not even the expected relationship is found. While Demsetz  Market-to-Book -This variable is seen as a proxy for the growth opportunities of a firm.
We presume that a firm with more growth opportunities, and also with more doubts by investors, would develop easily in a developed capital market. Kahn and Winton (1998) and Goergen (1998) , show in theoretical and empirical terms respectively, that the ownership retention by the initial shareholders will be lower, after an IPO, on firms characterised by growth opportunities with need of external finance. Market-to-book is defined as total assets (Worldscope Item, WC 02999) minus book equity -defined as total assets minus total liabilities (WC 03351) and preferred stock (WC 03451) plus deferred taxes (WC 03263) and convertible debt (WC 18282) -plus market capitalisation (WC 08001), local currency denominated, divided by total assets.
Country level variables
 Legal Environment -Legal country origin is a measure of legal environment. Country origin is divided in the two main important legal families, common and civil law origins. Civil law origins, on the other hand, produced three variants of law: French, German, and Scandinavian legal environment. La Porta et al (1997, 1998)  Corporate Disclosure -We expect that more diffused ownership structures to prevail in countries where accounting and financial disclosure presents higher standards (La Porta et al (1998) 
Multivariate Regressions
A Logit regression model is used to examine the relationship between the probability of a firm's with a specific ultimate owner switch to another one, conditional on a vector of explanatory independent X. The dependent variable is 1 for a given class of ultimate owner and 0 for the remaining. This relationship can be expressed as following where
The β′ is the parameter estimated from the sample data for each independent variable and X represents the explanatory variables, including market capitalization, market-to book, volatility, legal system, disclosure level, private credit, economic freedom and religion. Sabanci families) that created truly giant business groups during the previous century, particularly after the 60s, period in which the State not also had a decisive weight in the economy but has allocated resources to the private sector. As Chilean families the Turkish used pyramidal structures to control their businesses. In Sweden, a Social democratic country, the Government has adopted measures, the legalization of dual class shares, to defend employment, sometimes contrarily to the idea of profit maximization. That was the reason why some individuals, namely the old Wallenberg family, control many important firms. In Portugal and Spain, on the other hand, the transition to democracy during the 70s and the development of their capital markets gave rise to major economic groups with family characteristics.
Results
Even when we compare the importance of Governments on the control of firms, considering different legal regimes, we observe the importance of the economic history.
The results presented in table III do not show any statistical difference between the number of firms controlled by Government in countries with different legal regimes (t-stat = -0.51).
There are 1.84 and 2.33 firms, on average, controlled by Governments respectively in Civil and Common law based regimes. However, if we exclude Asian countries, the results change to 1.84 and 0.43 with 5% statistical significance (t-stat = 2.77). It seems that the interference of the Government on economy is not similar in all Common law based countries.
In fact, the most common is the largest companies being controlled by managers (widely held), or, alternatively, said control is carried out by shareholders with different characteristics (miscellaneous, as we defined in section 2.1.1.), but for different reasons.
The correlation coefficient between the number of firms widely held by country and the median market capitalization is 0.64. Thus, when we are in the presence of countries whose firms are large (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the UK and the USA (vd. In panel A is done the analysis for individuals, and it is possible to conclude that market capitalization influences negatively such corporate structures, i.e., these companies generally present a small size. On the other hand, in line with La Porta et al (1999), these corporate structures seem to be more observed in civil law based countries. The explanation that appears to be more plausible for this is related with the countries´ economic history. In some of them, with smaller companies, the State promoted the delivery of vital sectors of its economy to local groups. This is particularly true for many countries, e.g. Chile,
Portugal and Turkey.
For companies owned by the Government (panel B), it should be noted that this type of financial structure is more visible in countries whose disclosure level is more limited, particularly in Greece, India and Thailand. Probably this is a result of these countries present a less developed financial system, as well as less transparent and where the State wants to continue playing a decisive role in the economy. This class of firm structures is more visible in non catholic based countries. Asian countries where Catholic religion is poorly disseminated is fundamental for such result.
In panel C are presented companies whose shareholder structure is diffuse, usually characterized by having more than one shareholder, the largest and a smaller, the latter with a role in the decisions of the management as a monitor. Usually the monitor is a financial intermediary (bank, hedge fund or asset manager), finding out growth firms (glamorous stocks) where the role of monitoring is crucial, particularly in terms of investment decisions made by the management. This occurs most frequently on banking based countries, and probably less on capital market based countries where shareholders are better protected.
Such corporate ownership structures are also more frequent on small firms (see panel C)
where it gets easier to be the second largest shareholder, with a role of monitoring the largest one. In fact, asset managers find out glamorous small stocks for their portfolios as a way of controlling the investments made by management/largest shareholder.
Finally regressions for widely held firms are reported in panel D, and the results of regressions were expected, market capitalization and economic freedom play an important and positive role in that category of firms. Widely held firms present large market capitalization and proliferate in an environment where the role of the private sector is defended, i.e., in countries characterized by economic freedom, giving the opportunity to be created larger capital markets with thousands of shareholders.
Conclusion
This research paper aims to assess the main forces that influence corporate ownership, more precisely the determinants of a firm owned by individuals, Government, miscellaneous of investors and widely held.
Firms owned by individuals, Government, miscellaneous investors or widely held, exist under different circumstances. While firms owned by individuals are small, proliferate on civil-law based countries with low levels of economic freedom, firms owned by Governments multiply under low standards of disclosure, emergent financial markets and non-civil-law environments.
On the other hand, the presence of miscellaneous investors is more frequent when stocks are glamorous and small wherein the smaller shareholder can easily use their limited resources and monitoring the management/larger shareholder. Finally, widely held firms are large and are stimulated by an economic freedom behavior.
Table I -Firm -Level Variables
The median market capitalisation of the 20 largest firms by country, million dollar denominated, is from Worldscope (WS Item, WC07211).
The median market-to-book of the 20 largest firms by country is also Worldscope. 
